Source
		CWGC	SDGW	Uttoxeter Advertiser	Other
Parents	Father was former Workhouse Master ar Daventry			1a	3
	Tom Durose				6a
Where born	Uttoxeter		Yes
When born	About 1896				6b, 7
Address	Ivy Cottage, Heath Road, Uttoxeter (with his Aunt, Miss M. Durose)	Yes		1a, 1c	6a
	Father:    39 Cheadle Road, Uttoxeter, and later 15 Church Street, Sunbury on Thames, Middlesex				6a
Spouse
Children
Employment Before Joining up	Passenger staff at Uttoxeter Station			1d
	North Staffordshire Railway - Uttoxeter Railway Station			1c
When enlisted	31st August 1914				6a
Where enlisted	Liverpool		Yes	1a	6a
Regiment	The King's (Liverpool Regiment) Rifles	Yes		1a, 1c
	The King’s (Liverpool) Regiment		Yes	1g	6a
Unit	1st/5th Bn.				6a
	5th Bn.	Yes	Yes	1a, 1c
	5th (T.F.)				3
Rank	Lance Corporal.			1c, 1e, 1f, 1g, 1h	2
	Rifleman			1d
	Private	Yes	Yes		3, 6a
Service Number	2464	Yes	Yes		3, 6a
Date of Death	21 May 1915	Yes	Yes	1a, 1c, 1e, 1f, 1g, 1h	2, 3, 6a
Age at time of death	19	Yes		1c	2, 6a
Where Killed or died	France/Flanders: Richebourg, Pas de Calais			1g
	Rawal Pindi Hospital, Wimereux, Boulogne			1f	6a
	Rawal Pindi General Hospital, Boulogne			1c
	Boulogne			1h
	Wimeraux Hospital, Boulogne			1d
How he died	Died of wounds		Yes	1c, 1e, 1f, 1h	6a
	Died of wounds received at Richebourg			1c, 1g	2
	Died of wounds received in action near Ypres			1d
Location of Grave or Memorial	Wimereux Communal Cemetery - Grave I. H. 20	Yes			6a
	Wimereux Cemetery, Boulogne				2
	Family gravestone, Uttoxeter Cemetery				4
	N.S.Railway. Cheddleton Railway Museum				3
	North Staffordshire Railway War Memorial, Stoke-on-Trent Station				3,4
	Uttoxeter Town War Memorial (Market Place)				3,4
Awards

 

The 1901 Census^[6b] recorded the family as follows:

 

Name	Age	Address	When born	Where born	Relationship to head of house
Tom Durose	31	16 &18 London Rd, Daventry		Uttoxeter	receiving officer
Harriet Durose	26			Uttoxeter	Aunt
Frederick A Durose	6			Daventry
Tom Durose	5		Abt 1896	Uttoxeter	Son
Olive G. Duroae	2			Daventry

According to the CWGC, he was a nephew of Miss. M. Durose and lived with her at Ivy Cottage, Heath Rd., Uttoxeter^{[1c, 5]}.

He was also the son of a former Workhouse Manager in Daventry^{[1a, 3]}.

Tom had formerly been a member of the passenger staff at Uttoxeter Railway Station and he was described by his colleagues as a favourite of all. He had lived in Uttoxeter for about two years^[1c] and his genial temperament made him a favourite wherever he went^[1c].

He had also been a member of the Uttoxeter Territorials’ Football Club^{[1a, 1c]}.

He enlisted in the Autumn of 1914^{[1a, 1c]}, which means that he joined the forces in September 1914, shortly after the outbreak of war. He joined-up with H. Axon, A. Ball and C. Wood, who were all railway co-workers^{[1a, 1c]}. He went into the 1^st/5^th King’s Liverpool Regiment^[6a]. He was 19 years old on enlistment and lived at 39 Cheadle Road, Uttoxeter^[6a,].

The Liverpool Regiment archives say that he was 5’ 6” tall with fair physical development^[6a].

He left for France on the 21^st of February 1915^[6a] and was admitted to Number 4 Field Ambulance on the 2^nd of April 1915 with impetigo^[6a]. He was discharged for duty three days later, on the 5^th of April 1915^[6a].

He was admitted again to Number 4 Field Ambulance on the 16^th of May 1915 with gunshot wounds to the head, which he had received at Richebourg l’Avoue^[6a]. From there he was taken to No. 1 Casualty Clearing Station (Choques) and admitted on the 18^th of May 1915^[6a]. The next day he was taken to Rawal Pindi Hospital (Wimereux) and he died of his wounds on the 19^th of May 1915^[6a].

The war diary^[6c]  and Regimental History^[6d]  by Everard Wyrall for the period leading up to his receiving his fatal wounds gives us a good idea of what happened to him. It is known as the Battle of Festubert, 15-25^th of May 1915 and it would appear that Tom was sent into an attack that his own commanders had tried to prevent because they considered the assault impracticable without incurring heavy losses. Previous assaults had been tried and had failed, and Tom and his compatriots advanced over land strewn with the bodies of their predecessors. It must have been very frightening:

When reading the following, remember that he was fatally wounded on the 16^th of May at Richebourg. On the same day one officer and 35 men of Tom’s battalion (5^th battalion, Liverpool Regiment) were killed:

The Regimental History^[6d] provides the context for the actions in which Tom would be involved:

No soldier can read the story of the King's Regiment (Liverpool) at Festubert in 1915, without a quickening of the pulse and the red blood coursing more quickly through his veins. For it is a story of fine leadership, hard fighting, and, despite great losses, undaunted courage in the face of fierce opposition from the enemy. While, so far as the Regiment is concerned, it was the first battle of the Great War in which a King's man won that most coveted of all honours - the Victoria Cross.

The attacks of the 9th May had not shaken the enemy nor compelled him to give ground. He could not, however, be allowed to settle down again secure in his trenches, and with the blood of the opposing forces hardly dry upon the ground, and that dread space between the lines, known as "No Man's Land," still thickly strewn with the bodies of brave men, another determined attack was to be made to break through the German positions and roll up the flanks - part of the Allied scheme of operations.

The task of the First Army was to push forward to Violairies and Beau Puits, to establish on the left a defensive flank on the La Bassee Estaires road, and to maintain the right of the Army at Givenchy. The I Corps (2nd and 7th Divisions) was to secure and consolidate the Festubert - La Turelle road from Points M.3 to R. 13. The Indian Corps was to assault the German first system of trenches between the ditches running south south east to north north west through Points V.5 and V.6, secure the German second line breastworks and Point V.6 and establish a flank at the latter point connecting with the front line then held by the Corps. As the attack of the 2nd Division progressed, the Indian Corps was to push on and secure the road from Port Arthur to Le Turelle.

The events in the days immediately leading up to Tom’s fatal engagement are summarised by the Regimental History^[6d], which says that "it was decided that the attack should be resumed on the night of the 12th inst., but the weather continued very dull and wintry, interfering much with artillery observation. Orders were finally issued, therefore, for the action to commence on the night of the 15th inst."

The war diary^[6c] elaborates on this:

14/5/15        Orders were received that the VI Inf[antry] Brigade would attack at 11.30pm.

1KRR, 2 Berks Regt and 7 KLR, who were in the trenches taken over from V Inf[antry] Brigade, were to form the firing line and supports.

1 KLR, 2 S Staffs and ourselves were to be Brigade Reserve.

At 2.50pm this order was cancelled.

The Regimental History^[6d] sets the scene for the events of the 15^th of May:

The 2nd Division and Indian Corps were to launch their attack at I 1.30 on the night of 15th May, then at 3.15 the next morning the 7th Division was to attack the German line from N.1 to P.5, and at the latter point establish close touch with the 2nd Division.

In the first attack the 2nd Division, under cover of darkness, was to assault the German trenches between Point R. 1 and the right of the Indian Corps and secure the line R.1 R.3 R.5 R.7 V.4; having secured this line the division was then to launch the second attack in conjunction with the attack of the 7th Division and secure the Ferme Cour d'Avoine and the line of the Festubert - Le Turelle road from Points P.14 to R. 13, both inclusive.

From the objectives of the 2nd and 7th Divisions1 it will be seen that an attempt was to be made to "pinch off" the intervening German defences between the inner flanks of both divisions. Only, unfortunately, those defences happened to be terribly strong and well defended with machine guns; that particular portion of the enemy's line also contained communication trenches between the front, support and reserve lines, along which troops could be moved rapidly up to the front line when an attack was made or threatened. Moreover, part of the German line bulged outwards enabling the enemy to pour a murderous enfilade fire on troops attacking across "No Man's Land."

Of the front to be attacked by the 2nd Division, that part against which the 6th Infantry Brigade was to hurl itself holds most interest for the King's Regiment.

The frontage of attack allotted to the 6th Brigade ran from R. 1 to the bend in the German line between R.6 and V.1, both these points being inclusive; the 5th Brigade was to attack on the left of the 6th - the line between R.6 to V.1, exclusive, to the north west corner of the salient between V.3 and V.6. The Meerut Division (Indian Corps) was on the left of the 5th Brigade.

The objectives allotted to the 6th Brigade were the first and second German lines between R. 1 and R.7 (the latter exclusive). R.1 and Q.2 were to be blocked, while the 5th Brigade, on the left, was to clear the first and second German lines from R.7 (inclusive) to a point north west of V.5 and then get into touch with the Meerut Division.

The War Diary^[6d] recorded the outcome:

15/5/15        Le Touret and Vicinity of Richebourg

Orders received that VI Inf[antry] Brigade would attack the enemy’s trenches at 11.30pm and that we were to furnish a working party of two Companies for digging and entrenching – remainder of Battalion to be held in readiness near Richebourg.

At 10.5pm the Battalion marched out from billets at Le Touret to Richebourg, two Companies going to billets at Queen Mary Rd in readiness to move. The remaining Companies A & B and Battalion HQ moved on to Prince Albert Rd. These two Companies were placed at the disposal of a Royal Engineers officer at 11.30pm to dig a communication trench from our front line trench to the German front line trench opposite after the attack on that trench timed to commence at 11.30pm.

At the request of the Royal Engineers another platoon was sent for and duly arrived at Battalion HQ. Some delay in starting work occurred, caused as it afterwards transpired through the Royal Engineer officer having been wounded.

Several casualties occurred during this period of waiting.

Eventually a Royal Engineer NCO was sent to carry on with our working party. This party on leaving the trench came almost immediately under German rifle and Machine Gun fire and many casualties occurred, amongst them being Captain RE Greig and 2nd Lieutenants GF Richardson and HB Cox. The working party was withdrawn just before dawn, having accomplished little, owing to the before mentioned delay resulting in their not getting going until about 1.15am and it becoming light at 2am.

The Regimental History^[6d] describes the result of the first attack at 11.30 p.m. on the night of 15th May was as follows:

The 1/7th King's, 1st R. Berks. and 1st K.R. Rifles of the 6th Brigade, had captured and occupied the line R.2, R.3, R.5 and R.6. Of the 5th Brigade the Inniskilling Fusiliers, on the left of the 1st K.R. Rifles, were between R.6 and V.1.

The Indian Corps had made no advance, having been held up at the outset by very heavy fire.

In the second attack at 3.15 a.m. no further advance was made by the 6th Brigade. The 7th Division was successful and by 7 a.m. held a line running from M.3 through M.g, P.2 and P.s; but it was that unattacked portion of the line between the two divisions which caused all the trouble and held up the attack until 3.30 p.m. on the 17th, causing the gallant troops, who, with splendid bravery, tried again and again to work inwards and join hands.

The second attack of the Indian Corps failed like the first.

On the 13th, 14th and 15th, deliberate bombardment of the enemy's trenches had been carried out, and from the artillery reports with the 2nd Division Diaries, it is clear that from R.1 to R.6 the enemy's wire had been well cut and his parapets and trenches considerably damaged. One report stated that: "Whole parapet between R.1 and R.2 very much knocked about; wire swept away. Through gaps in front line wire entanglements can be seen in front of second line." These reports, circulated down to Battalion Commanding Officers, gave confidence to the troops as they watched the storm of shells falling on the enemy's positions, and all ranks were full of optimism as to the result of the attack.

After darkness had fallen on 15th May final preparations were made. The guns had begun the last stage of the bombardment at 6.15 p.m.

The Regimental History^[6d] describes what was planned for the 16^th of May, the day when Tom received his fatal wounds, as follows:

In the second attack (at 3.15 a.m. on 16th) the 6th Brigade was to capture the Ferme Cour d'Avoine, establish itself on the line P.14 Q.12 and gain touch with the 7th Division about P.14. This objective included the German communication trench running from south east to north west through Q. 15; the 5th Brigade was to capture the Ferme du Bois and establish itself on the line Q. 12 (exclusive) to R. 13 (inclusive), maintaining touch with the Indian Corps.

Of the Meerut Division (Indian Corps) the Garhwal Brigade was to assault the German trenches on the immediate left of the 5th Brigade (2nd Division) - the Sirhind Brigade was to be in reserve at Lansdowne Post.

For several days before the operations were due to begin the assault had been practised behind the front line, every movement being very carefully rehearsed. Not only were the assaulting troops fully instructed as to their part in the attack, but the sand bag and engineer parties, who were to carry shovels and implements for consolidating the positions when won, were shown what to do.

Guns of all calibre were to subject the enemy's trenches to a particularly heavy bombardment before the assault took place.

In the Rue du Bois sector there were, along the 2nd Division front, four lines of trenches. Two - "A" and "B" - (front and support lines respectively) were east of the Rue du Bois, the other two - "C" and "D" - were west of it.

The War diary^[6c] describes the outcome as follows:

16/5/15        Richebourg

About 4am C & D Companies who had been brought up to the support trenches were ordered to advance into the firing line and support the 1st Liverpool in an attack on the German trenches. They moved to the fire trench with Battalion HQ across the open under heavy rifle and shell fire – both shrapnel and High Explosive – Captain JH Grindley commanding ‘D’ Company and Captain DH Grindley his second in command were both wounded during this advance, the former slightly, the latter severely.

A & B Companies who had formed the night working party were already in the fire trench.

The 1st Liverpool Regt had delivered their attack and failed, suffering heavy loss.

The OC 5 KLR was ordered to make a careful reconnaissance and report to GOC Brigade on the situation. After reconnaissance and consultation with OC 1 KLR on the left and OC 7 KLR on the right, he reported that he considered the assault was impracticable without incurring heavy losses.

The Brigade ordered an attack to be made, so at about 8am No 5 and No 6 Platoons led the attack under Captain WL Evans, Lieutenant GH Cohen and 2nd Lieutenant GR Mellor. The advance was gallantly made but it was almost immediately overwhelmed by the enemy’s rifle and Machine Gun fire and most of the men were shot down. Only a very were able to get more than half way across the space (about 250 yards) intervening between our trench and that of the Germans.

Lieutenant Cohen was hit twice and killed and Captain Evans was severely wounded. Some survivors made their way back during the day and many others after darkness had set in.

Major SSG Cohen and Captain RJ Fairclough, No 856 Sgt E Cooney, 1432 Private GP Benbow and 2778 Private BA Hoy made gallant attempts to bring in wounded during broad daylight and a few were got in, but the first three mentioned were wounded.

We were heavily shelled by the enemy during the day from mid-day and between 3pm and 3.30pm this became intense and seemed to be the prelude to a counter attack at dusk. This was expected and the Battalion was in readiness.

This is expanded in the Regimental History as follows^[6d]:

The assaulting battalions of the 6th Brigade assembled in "A" and "B" lines, the 1/7th King's Regiment on the right, the 1st Royal Berks. in the centre, the 1st K.R.R. on the left, the 1st King's Regiment and the 2nd South Staffords were in support in "C" and "D" lines. The 1/5th King's were in Brigade Reserve - "C" and "D" Companies in billets in Queen Mary's Road, "A" and "B" Companies and Battalion Headquarters in Prince Albert Road. The latter companies had been placed at the disposal of the R.E. to dig a communication trench from the British to the German front line trench after the attack at 11.30 a.m. had been launched.

The 1/7th King's (Lieut. Colonel W. H. Stott) had moved into "A" and "B" lines during the afternoon - "A" and "B" Companies of the battalion were to make the initial attack.

The 1st King's (Lieut. Colonel C. J. Steavenson) moved up later, and by 10.30 were located in "C" and "D" lines - "C" and "D" Companies in front, "A" and "B" in rear. The enemy's artillery was fairly active, some heavy shells falling among "A" and "B" Companies, and by 11p.m. Lieut. C. A. Miller, commanding "A" Company, and several men had been wounded.

At about 11p.m. the assaulting troops, in small parties, crept over the parapet, and, advancing a few yards, lay down in "No Man's Land." Others followed, until the first, second and third lines lay out in front of the trenches, awaiting the signal to attack. Along the front of the 6th Brigade all troops were in position, ready, by 11.15p.m. The forming up operations were, apparently, unperceived by the enemy, whose machine gunners and riflemen were inactive. On the left, however, shortly after 11p.m., machine gun fire had broken out in front of the 5th Infantry Brigade, the attacking battalions of which suffered casualties during the forming up operations.

At 11.30 p.m. the attack began along the front of the 2nd Division and the Indian Corps. The troops advanced at first in "quick time," but as they neared the enemy's trenches they broke into the "double." The distance between the opposing lines was from 300 to 350 yards. On the 6th Brigade front the first 150 yards were covered without a shot being fired at the three attacking battalions; on the left the 5th Brigade was still under heavy machine gun and rifle fire. But when about 200 yards from the German trenches the 1/7th King's, Berkshires and Rifles, also came under violent fire and the advance across "No Man's Land" was finished at a rush.

So far as the King's Regiment (Liverpool) is concerned the actual records are meagre. The Diary of the 1/7th Battalion is all too brief and uninteresting; "Attack started at 11.30 p.m. `A' and `B' Companies in attack moved over parapet about 10.45 p.m. and waited. Attack successful. German line carried. Half `D' Company took up ammunition later." That is all. The Diary of the 1st Battalion and also the Diary of the 6th Brigade Headquarters for May, 1915, are missing. The following account is, therefore, based on information from private sources1 and from the official communiques from France during the operations.

On the right of the attack, the 1/7th King's rushed through the torn wire and entered battered trenches between R.1 and R.2. The battalion had, however, during the advance, become merged with the Berkshires on their left and the point R.1 was not actually captured in the first rush. Along this portion of the first attack the Germans were actually engaged in a relief when the King's men dashed into their trenches, bayoneting or shooting down all who refused to surrender or showed fight.

The Berkshires in the centre, and the Rifles on the left, had also won forward into the enemy's first line, but the 5th Brigade, though gallantly endeavouring to get on, were under a murderous machine gun fire. They had a salient in front of them and the enemy was able to bring a terrific enfilade fire on the brave fellows as they made frantic efforts to storm the German line. The Inniskilling Fusiliers did, indeed, succeed in entering and occupying the enemy's front line, but they had to throw back their left flank, and the Worcesters, on their left, were unable to advance at all.

In the meantime the 1/7th King's had pushed on towards the German second line trenches.

At about 12.30 a.m. (16th) "D" Company of the 1st Battalion had reinforced the Berkshires, and "C" Company carried out similar duties at 1 a.m. As these two companies went forward "A" and "B" Companies (also of the 1st King's) moved up, and by 2 a.m. were in "A" lines with the 2nd South Staffords on their left. The 1st King's were to have attacked through the Berkshires in the direction of Cour d'Avoine, but the two leading companies were too scattered and could not be organised in anything like attack formation. Word to this effect was sent back to Brigade Headquarters.

However, in response to another urgent order the battalion started forward across "No Man's Land," and what happened is written down thus in the (then) Commanding Officer's private diary: "At 3.30 a.m. `B' Company attempted the crossing by platoons. The first one was mown down by machine gun fire from Q.2 on the right. (Q.2 was in that sector of the line between the 2nd and 7th Divisions not attacked.) The second was out before I could stop it and was also wiped out, but I managed to stop the third moving. Reported this to Brigade. Then started a very heavy bombardment of our front and communication trenches which lasted all day (16th). The communication trench was completely wrecked. We suffered heavily (over 100 casualties) and there was not the slightest bit of parados to protect the men from the back explosions. About 3 p.m., in response for calls for ammunition, parties of `A' Company, most gallantly led by young Hutchison, dashed across the 300 yards separating the two lines and managed, by crawling the last half on hands and knees, to get two thirds of the men over, in spite of heavy machine gun fire from the right. Each man carried four bandoliers so they got across a fair amount."

The story of the 1/5th Battalion (Lieut. Colonel J. M. McMaster) is interesting. It will be remembered that in the first attack at 11.30 p.m. "A" and "B" Companies were detached as a working party to dig a communication trench across "No Man's Land" to join up with the first German line, when captured.

Delay in starting this work occurred, caused, as afterwards transpired, by the R.E. officer, who was to direct the work, having been wounded. During the waiting severe casualties were suffered. Eventually an N.C.O. from the Engineers was sent to carry on with the working party. But hardly had the men set foot in "No Man's Land" when they were met by a storm of machine gun and rifle bullets, and many more casualties were suffered, among them being Capt. W. E. Greig and Second Lieuts. G. F. Richardson and H. B. Cox, who were wounded. To dig in that inferno was impossible, and just before dawn the working party was withdrawn, having accomplished little.

About 4 a.m. "C" and "D" Companies of the 5th Battalion were ordered to advance into the firing line in support of the 1st Battalion, or rather the two companies of the 1st Battalion still in "A" line, who were to cross "No Man's Land." These two companies of the 1/5th, with Battalion Headquarters, moved up across the open and came under heavy rifle and machine gun fire and shell fire. Capt. J. H. Grindley, commanding "D" Company, and Capt. D. R. Grindley, were both wounded during the advance, the latter seriously. "C" and "D" Companies joined up with "A" and "B" Companies, who were already in the front trench ("A").

Colonel McMaster was then ordered to make a careful reconnaissance and report to 6th Brigade Headquarters on the situation. After the reconnaissance, and on consulting the Commanding Officers, 1st and 1/7th King's, he reported that an assault was impracticable without incurring further heavy losses. The Brigadier, however, ordered an attack to be made.

It was about 8 a.m. when Nos. 5 and 6 Platoons, under Capt. W. L. Evans, Lieut. G. H. Cohen and Second Lieut. G. R. Mellor, led the attack from "A" lines across "No Man's Land," the 1/7th having received orders to work to the right with the idea of gaining touch with the 7th Division. The advance was gallantly made, but the enemy's rifle and machine gun fire was too severe and these platoons were almost wiped out. Only a few men were able to get half way across the dread space between "A" lines and the German trenches on the right of R. I Lieut. Cohen, twice wounded, was killed, and Capt. Evans severely wounded. During the day some men who had taken cover out in "No Man's Land," crawled back and others came in after darkness had fallen on 16th. Major S.S.G. Cohen, Capt. R.J. Fairclough, Sergeant E. Cooney and Riflemen G.P. Benbow and B.A. Hoy made gallant efforts to bring in wounded in broad daylight, and a few were got in in this way, but the first three mentioned were wounded.

The 1/7th stated that, when on 16th the attack was renewed, the battalion attempted to send up reinforcements to the forward companies but they were wiped out by machine gun fire: "About 200 yards of the enemy's trenches," records the Diary, "surrendered, roughly 250 men. Our casualties heavy - 9 officers killed, wounded and about 220 other ranks killed, wounded and missing."

At about 8 a.m. it had become evident that movement between the captured trenches and the old British front line was not possible, the space being swept by violent rifle and machine gun fire, much of which was in enfilade. It was not until 9 a.m. that the success of the 7th Division, on the right of the 2nd Division, made itself felt, and repeated calls for ammunition from the troops holding the captured trenches were answered by dribbling men across, hostile fire from the right being less severe.

By 10 a.m. the situation was settling down for the day. The K.R. Rifles, Berkshires, about two and a half companies of 1/7th King's, about two companies of 1st King's and one company of the South Staffords, were now in the captured trenches and holding the line from between R.6 and R.2, almost to R.1 and along the old second line German trenches through R.5 and R.3.

Throughout the daylight hours the enemy's shell fire was intense, but he paid more attention to our old trenches than to his lost positions. Nevertheless the supporting troops, being somewhat congested in "A" and "B" lines, sustained very heavy casualties.

At 6 p.m. orders were issued for reliefs to take place in the new front. The 1st King's were to take over the captured lines from near R.1 to about mid way between R.3 and R.5, the South Staffords to continue the line and maintain touch with the 5th Brigade towards R.7; the Berkshires, King's R. Rifles and 1/7th King's were to withdraw to "A" and "B" lines.

"Got up by about 11.30p.m.," said Colonel Steavenson, "reorganised the companies already there and occupied `The Bulge,' the forward part of the captured German trench. The South Staffords relieved the K.R.R. (on the left of the 1st King's); the 5th and 7th King's back in `A' line. Great difficulty in getting the rations and water up for the men; rain had started and the trenches were very slippery. Norris and I found a boarded dug out, small and hard, but dry. Put in two hours' sleep."

What was now (night of 16th/17th) the situation? In the first rush of the initial attack on the night of 15th the 6th Brigade had captured the two lines of German trenches, R.6 and R.2 to nearly R.1 and R.7 - R.5 and R.3. Little progress had been made during the 16th. This was practically the whole extent of the 2nd Division's gains. But still, on the night 16th/17th, touch had not yet been obtained with the 7th Division on the right, whose line ran from P.5 P.4 N.8 N.7 N.6 to the Quinque Rue. There therefore remained a considerable gap between the right of the 2nd Division near R.1 and the left of the 7th Division at P.5 - a gap of great strength, strongly reinforced and covered by large numbers of machine guns. This intervening space included two lines of breastworks running from front to rear, constructed so as to give fire laterally in both directions behind the front, and a series of redoubts consisting of strongly fortified posts and farm buildings connected by trenches

In his obituary the Uttoxeter Advertiser reported on a letter which Tom’s brother Fred had sent to their aunt, Miss Durose^[1c]. In this letter he told her that Tom had received severe gunshot wounds to the head in an action near to Ypres. He told her that he was taken to the Rawal Pindo British Hospital, Wimereux, near Boulogne, but died there.

In his letter, Fred urged their relatives not to grieve too much at the loss and added “You must remember that Tom died for his country, doing his duty like a man, and he can be counted amongst the nation’s heroes” ^[1c].

.In June 1915 the Uttoxeter Advertiser reported a meeting in which a representative meeting of all grades of the North Staffordshire Railway staff gathered at Uttoxeter Station^[1d]. They met to show their sympathy and pass on votes of condolence with the relatives of the two members of the railway staff who had died for King and Country. Tom Durose was one, and Arthur Harvey was the other.

The secretary, Guard L. Hassall, said that they had met to show their sympathy and to pass on votes of condolence with the relatives of the two members of the railway staff who had recently lost their lives in the service of their King and Country.

During this meeting it was said that Tom had been most attentive to his duties and his bright and cheery personality would be much missed.

District Inspector Whitehurst moved the vote of condolence with the father and family of Tom Durose. Tom was described as a much-esteemed member of the passenger staff. Mr. T. Brown, stationmaster, seconded, and added that although Tom had gone to the front before he took charge, he had heard so many kindly remarks about him that he was sure that they all regretted his death deeply.

The secretary was asked to convey the votes of condolence to both families.

It was then decided that Reverend W. Armstrong of Uttoxeter’s Parish Church should be approached with a view to arranging for a memorial service. The intention was that all members of the Railway staff of the Uttoxeter district should attend.

Inspector Whitehurst proposed, and Guard Hassall seconded, that Fourth-Officer Wilks should be asked to arrange for the Ambulance Corps to be present in uniform. Mr. Wilcox said that he would be pleased to make the arrangements, but as so many had joined the forces, only a third of the members were left, and the remainder were awaiting orders. As the two deceased railwaymen were local heroes, it was therefore decided to invite other bodies from the town, including the Volunteer Corps, the Police, Boy Scouts and gentlemen of the town.

In replying to a vote of thanks, the Chairman said how very much he regretted the passing of the two young members of the staff, whose loss they mourned. They had answered the call, and were brave English lads of whom they were proud.

It was then decided that when this terrible war was over the railwaymen of Uttoxeter should subscribe for a permanent roll of honour to their noble dead, and also to those brave fellows who were spared to return, so that in future they would always have a reminder of the glorious answer of the railwaymen to their country’s call.

It is a sobering thought that this all happened in the middle of 1915 and the war still had nearly another three and a half years to run. Nobody at that meeting could have foreseen the scale of the killing to come, or the number of railwaymen who would eventually be called upon to serve in the forces and die for their country.

This notice was posted in May 1916[1e] to mark the first anniversary of his death

In Loving Memory of Lance-Corpl. Tom Durose, died of wounds, May 21, 1915. “Too dearly loved to be forgotten.” - From his Sorrowing Relatives.

This marked the second anniversary in May 1917[1f]

In Loving Memory of Lance-Corpl. Tom Durose, who died of wounds in Rawal Pindi Hospital, Wimereux, Boulogne, May 21, 1915. - “Too dearly loved to be forgotten.”

This was posted in May 1918[1g] to mark the third anniversary

In affectionate remembrance of Lance Corpl. Tom Durose, King’s Liverpool Regiment, who died of wounds received at Richebourg, May 21, 1915 – Ever in our thoughts.

This marked the fourth anniversary[1h] in May 1919

In Sincerest Remembrance of Lance-Corpl. Tom Durose, who died of wounds at Boulogne, May 21, 1915.  – “Memory keeps our dear one near us.”